This paper examines optimal redistribution in a model with high and low-skilled individuals with heterogeneous tastes for labor, that either work or not. With such double heterogeneity, traditional Welfarist criteria including Utilitarianism fail to take the compensation-responsibility trade-off into account. As a response, several other criteria have been proposed in the literature. This paper is the first to compare the extent to which optimal policies based on different normative criteria obey the principles of compensation (for differential skills) and responsibility (for preferences for labor), when labor supply is along the extensive margin. The criteria from the social choice literature perform better in this regard than the traditional criteria, both in first and second best. More importantly, these equality of opportunity criteria push the second best policy away from an Earned Income Tax Credit and in the direction of a Negative Income tax.
Introduction
Assuming labor supply along the participation (also called extensive) margin implies that a larger transfer towards low-paid workers than inactive people, i.e. an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), may become part of an optimal tax system (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002; Brewer et al. (2008) ; Choné and Laroque, 2009 ). This well-known result is obtained under Utilitarian social preferences while agents differ in terms of skills as well as preferences. However, it is commonly admitted that preference heterogeneity poses ethical questions which challenge standard objective functions like Utilitarianism, see, e.g., Rawls (1971) , Sen (1980) and Dworkin (1981) . Other normative criteria based on fairness requirements have been proposed in the social choice literature. However, they are scarcely used to derive optimal tax policies. The optimal income tax literature itself considers alternative social preferences but always with labor supply along the intensive margin. For instance, Boadway et al. (2002) use a Utilitarian social welfare function where different weights can be assigned to individuals with different preferences for leisure. This amounts to using different cardinalizations of individual utility functions. Paternalistic criteria, in which the planner uses a reference value for the taste for work and maximizes the sum of these adjusted utilities have also been considered, by, e.g. Schokkaert et al. (2004) . Assuming high and low-skilled agents with heterogeneous tastes for labor, labor supply along the participation margin, this paper compares the optimal tax policies under a large set of social preferences from the social choice and the optimal taxation literature. We show that the social choice inspired criteria provide an additional argument for an optimal tax system away from the EITC. A lower transfer towards low-paid workers than inactive people, i.e. a Negative Income Tax (NIT), is more likely to become optimal. Moreover, under the assumption that the low-skilled have at least as large a participation elasticity as the high-skilled agents, the labor supply distortion for the highly skilled is tempered.
The second contribution of this paper is to check the optimal tax policies against equality of opportunity requirements. The dominant branch of the equality of opportunity literature, liberal egalitarian theories of justice, argues that income or welfare inequalities arising from nonresponsibility factors such as innate skills should be eliminated (the compensation principle) and inequalities arising from responsibility factors such as preferences should be respected (the responsibility principle).
1 This paper then checks the optimal schedules we obtain using the criteria from social choice and also the ones from the optimal income tax literature against the compensation and responsibility principles. Unsurprisingly, the criteria which originate from the social choice approach to equality of opportunity perform much better than the traditional criteria, both under full and asymmetric information. Under the latter assumption, we also consider an alternative strategy that restricts the search for an optimal tax policy satisfying one of the equality of opportunity principles.
The third contribution is to propose five new normative criteria which satisfy priority to the worst-off (and thus weak) versions of the compensation and responsibility principles. They rely on a cardinal or, alternatively, on an ordinal measures of welfare. We show that these criteria, just like the social choice inspired criteria push the optimal tax away from an earned income tax credit and temper the labor supply distortion of the highly skilled.
1 (δ H (α) = 0) if w H -agents with this value for α are employed (inactive). As a consequence
) is the fraction of w L -agents (w H -agents) that are employed. w L -agents cannot get access to high-skilled jobs, and, since efficiency matters, it will never be optimal that w H -agents work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in highskilled jobs instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more which can be used to increase someone's consumption. Hence, formally, the government determines four consumption functions: x w L (α) for the w L -workers, x w H (α) for the w H -workers, x u L (α) for the w L -inactive agents and x u H (α) for the w H -inactive. All these functions go from R + to R + .
The Government budget constraint can be formulated as follows:
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement, which can be positive or negative. This budget constraint must be binding at the optimum as all government objectives considered in the paper are increasing in individuals' consumption.
The problem for the government in the first best is to determine the functions x In the second best, the tax schedule can depend only on income levels (0, w L or w H ). The government then defines three consumption levels x u , x L and x H , denoting consumption levels when not participating in the labor force, when working in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs, respectively. These consumption levels have to meet the government budget constraint, the set of self-selection constraints (which will be stated in Section 5) and have to be normatively desirable.
The next section discusses which normative principles or criteria the government can use.
Equality of opportunity
The next subsection formally defines equality of opportunity in order to study whether the normative criteria usually assumed in the optimal tax literature succeed in reaching it.
Two equality of opportunity principles
Define, for the case where Y = L or H, the evaluation of the consumption bundle (x Y (α) , δ Y (α))
EWEP (Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences):
An allocation satisfying EWEP is such that differences in skills do not influence a person's welfare. The second axiom of equality of opportunity expresses the idea of responsibility:
ETES (Equal Transfers for Equal Skills): ∀α, α ′ : δ L (α) = δ L (α ′ ) = 1 and ∀α ′′ : δ L (α ′′ ) = 0 :
′ : δ H (α) = δ H (α ′ ) = 1 and ∀α ′′ : δ H (α ′′ ) = 0 :
with some abuse of notations for the last term in both expressions. The latter emphasizes that taxes only depend on skill level. People are hold responsible for their taste for leisure α. For each skill level all inactive get the same benefit, all workers pay the same tax, and the transfer received by the inactive is equal to minus the tax paid by the workers. Therefore, welfare differences that are caused by differential tastes are not compensated and fully respected.
We formally define full equality of opportunity as follows:
FEO (Full Equality of Opportunity):
An allocation satisfies full equality of opportunity if it satisfies both EWEP and ETES.
In the traditional framework, where the government only (re-)distributes consumption, even in the first best there does not exist a FEO allocation -see, e.g., Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert (1995) . For this reason, Fleurbaey (1995b) suggested weakening at least one of the axioms, while maintaining the other 5 . This allowed him to characterize two allocations. Keeping ETES but requiring EWEP only for situations where all agents have a reference value for the taste parameter α characterize the conditional equality allocation defined below. Keeping EWEP but requiring ETES only for situations where all agents have a reference value for the resource bundle, here taken to be the consumption level x and δ Y = 1 (Y = L or H), characterizes the egalitarian equivalent allocation.
CE (Conditional Equality):
An allocation is the conditional equality allocation if and only if for all α and all Y it equalizes u (x Y (α) , δ Y (α) , α) at the highest feasible level.
EE (Egalitarian Equivalence):
An allocation is egalitarian equivalent if and only if for all α and all Y : u (x Y (α) , δ Y (α) , α) = u ( x, 1, α) and x is at the highest feasible level.
The CE allocation ensures that all individuals are equally well off with their actual bundle of resources when this is evaluated using the reference preference α. The EE allocation makes all individuals indifferent between their actual resource bundle and the reference bundle which gives them x and where they have to work. 6 In our definition here, we incorporate that no resources are wasted by, in the CE allocation, equalizing at the highest possible level, and in the EE allocation pursuing indifference at the highest feasible level of x . A CE or EE allocation need not exist. In particular, in the second best, it will not be possible to equalize the reference utilities as required by CE, and, even in the first best, indifference for all individuals with the reference bundle is not feasible in our model. We formulate maximin social orderings inspired by the CE and EE allocation at the end of the next subsection.
Different social objective functions
The paper will consider the following social objective functions extensively used in the optimal taxation literature.
The Utilitarian social objective function (used in a.o., Ebert (1992) , Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) , Boadway et al. (2000) , Hellwig (2007) ) is the average of all individual utilities, i.e.
Our Welfarist social objective is the average of a concave transformation of individual utilities.
The concave transformation allows the expression of inequality aversion with respect to the distribution of utilities. Let the function Ψ : R → R : a → Ψ (a) be a strictly concave function. Our
Welfarist objective function is
Assumed in the seminal article of Mirrlees (1971) , this welfare function has been very popular since then (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , Diamond (1998) , Laroque (2005), Kaplow (2008) , Kleven et al. (2009) ).
The Boadway et al. (2002) 's objective function allows to attach a weight to individuals' utilities that depends on their taste for leisure. Let W (α) : R + → R + : α → W (α) be the social welfare weight given to the utility of an individual with disutility of labor equal to α. The Boadway et al. objective function is given by
This objective function was explicitly introduced to deal with individuals that are heterogeneous in skills and preferences. Also used in Cremer et al. (2004 and 2007) for instance, this criterion adopts distinct cardinalizations of individual utilities depending on the individual's taste parameter α.
Our Non-Welfarist social objective function uses a paternalistic view for the valuation of labor disutility. We define the reference labor disutility as α ≥ 0, which is the weight attached by the government to the α of every individual. The social objective becomes
With this objective function, the social planner has a different idea than the individuals themselves about the 'correct' or reasonable disutility of work. There is then a clear paternalistic motive for taxation which arises from differences between social and private preferences. Schokkaert et al. (2004) consider this social objective function. Marchand et al. (2003) and Pestieau and Racionero (2009) consider an alternative paternalistic approach in which the government attaches a larger weight to the labor disutility of disabled individuals. Maximization of non-welfarist social objective functions typically selects allocations that are not Pareto efficient.
To state the next two objective functions, which are less standard, we define an operator that takes the first element of a set with two elements if δ (α) equals one, and the second element otherwise. Formally, we define the operator as
{a, b} = a if δ (α) = 1 and oper
Roemer (1993 and 1998) proposes that equality of opportunity for welfare holds when the utilities of all those who exercised a comparable degree of responsibility are equal, irrespective of their skills. Assuming that those that have the same preferences have exercised a comparable degree of responsibility, the ideal is to give the same utility to those with the same preferences, irrespective of their skills. Since utilities have to be equal for each preference, it will usually (except, as we will see in the first best) not be possible to achieve this. Roemer therefore suggests to maximize a weighted average of the minimal utilities across individuals having the same tastes.
As a result, Fleurbaey (2008) calls this the mean of mins criterion. Roemer' s (1998) objective function can be written as
For each α, the government assigns low and high skilled individuals to employment or inactivity.
The min function in the integral term takes, for each α level, the smallest utility across skill types.
The Roemer rule maximizes the sum (over α) of these minimal utility levels. It has been used by Roemer et al. (2003) to empirically compare the extent to which fiscal policies manage to equalize opportunities for income acquisition in a set of countries.
While Roemer's proposal is well known, an obvious alternative was proposed by Van de gaer (1993) . The starting point is that for each level of skill, utility as a function of the taste parameter can be interpreted as the utilities to which someone with that skill level has access. The proposal is then to maximize the value of the smallest opportunity set, where the opportunity set is the surface under utilities to which he has access, weighted by the frequency with which the corresponding preference parameter occurs. Hence the proposed social objective function, labeled the min of means criterion by Fleurbaey (2008) , is
This criterion and Roemer's criterion were used to compute optimal linear income taxes in Bossert et al. (1999) and Schokkaert et al. (2004) .
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We formulate the maximin objective function inspired by the Conditional Equality (CE) allocation:
meaning that the optimal policy is determined such that the lowest level of utility that someone in the population gets with his actual allocation, evaluated at the reference preferences α, is as high as possible. The resulting optimal allocation is not necessarily Pareto efficient. The criterion was explicitly considered by Bossert et al. (1999) .
Finally, we formulate a maximin objective function inspired by the Egalitarian Equivalent (EE) allocation. For each individual, we determine the consumption level that he needs when he has to work and is such that he is indifferent to this bundle and his actual consumption bundle. Evidently, for workers, this is simply their actual consumption level. Inactive people require a consumption
is their actual consumption level. Hence, we can define an EE ordering as maximizing
In our framework, this social ordering is the natural counterpart of the ordering proposed by Maniquet (2005 and . In their papers, the equivalent wage for an individual is defined as the wage rate such that he is indifferent between his actual bundle and the bundle that he could reach if he had his equivalent wage. Their proposed social ordering is then to maximize the minimal equivalent wage. Fleurbaey and Maniquet work in an intensive labor supply choice model; the computation of the equivalent wage involves a counterfactual labor supply choice lying between inactivity and full time employment. In our extensive labor supply model, such a choice is not available. However, we can adjust the concept by comparing the actual consumption bundle with the wage making the individual indifferent with full time employment. Formally, in our extensive margin model, the equivalent wage is defined for the employed as x wE Y (α) = x w Y (α) and for the inactive as
Maximinning this equivalent wage leads to the social ordering defined in (9).
First best
This section studies the optimal policies under full information with criteria that are only loosely based on equality of opportunity principles as well as criteria directly inspired by equality of oppor-7 Axiomatic characterizations of these criteria can be found in Ooghe et al. (2007) and Fleurbaey (2008 
Under this activity assignment rule, those low-(high-) skilled with disutility from work smaller than α X * L (α X * H ) are employed, while those with a higher disutility from work are inactive and more highly than lowly skilled are employed.
Theorem 1a. With full information, the following configuration of policies is optimal:
(a) Utilitarian planner:
Consumption bundles:
(c) Boadway et al. planner: Consumption bundles:
Activity assignment:
Case 1:
Case 2:
8 All proofs are given in Appendix A.
Activity assignment: AAR R .
(f) Van de gaer planner:
(a) Utilitarian planner A Utilitarian planner gives the same consumption x U to everyone, irrespective of his skill level and his taste parameter. Workers are clearly worse off than inactive people; the worst off will be the high-skilled workers with taste parameter α *
H . (b) Welfarist planner
The main difference between a Welfarist and a Utilitarian planner is that a Welfarist planner will give different consumption bundles to workers, depending on their disutility of labor.
More precisely, it can be shown that ∂x
A Welfarist planner tries to compensate workers with a higher disutility of labor by giving them additional consumption, but the compensation is insufficient to make utility independent of labor disutility:
∂ v x wW y (α) − α /∂α < 0. As a result, the high-skilled worker with taste α * H remains the worst off, as under the Utilitarian criterion. Moreover, consumption of workers is equalized at each α
The Boadway et al. planner's consumption function depends on tastes only. If the weight given to individuals with a higher disutility of labor α increases (decreases), those with a higher (lower) 
9 For this and the other formal properties stated in this discussion, see appendix A.
(f) Van 
. This equality never occurs except under Roemer's criterion. Since, in addition, Roemer's allocation is also such that ∀α ∈ [0, α * R L ) (∀α ∈ [α * R H , ∞)), everyone works (is inactive) and receives the same consumption, Roemer's allocation satisfies EWEP.
For all above optimal allocations ∃α,
this violates ETES.
We next turn to the FEO, CE and EE criteria described in the previous section. These criteria are directly inspired by the equality of opportunity axioms.
Theorem 1b. With full information, the following configuration of policies is optimal:
(a) FEO:
There are five types of optimal allocations possible:
(c) EE:
By construction, the FEO allocations satisfy both EWEP and ETES, however they are quite trivial. FEO (i) assigns everyone to work while FEO (ii) implies that everyone is inactive. FEO (i) and (ii) give everyone the same consumption. Note that, contrary to FEO (i), FEO (ii) gives everyone the same utility. It is easy to verify that neither of the FEO allocations is Pareto efficient.
(b) CE allocation
With the CE criterion, the two FEO allocations can be optimal as well as three others. The latter are denoted by CE (ii), (iii) and (iv). The CE allocation equalizes u (x Y (α) , δ Y (α) , α) for all α and Y = L, H. Therefore, welfares are equalized when bundles are evaluated with references preferences, but not with actual preferences (see, (ii), (iii), (iv)). EWEP is thus not satisfied. We will now check the validity of ETES. In the CE allocation (ii), all high-skilled work and a fraction of the low-skilled agents work. All high-skilled people receive the same consumption bundle x w H and all low-skilled people receive the same transfer −x u = w L − x w L . This CE allocation thus satisfies ETES. CE allocation (iii) has all high-skilled and no low-skilled working. ETES is then satisfied.
The CE allocation (iv) has only a fraction of the high-skilled working. Again the planner does not care which high-skilled. Since no low-skilled work, and for the high-skilled
Which of these CE allocations is the optimal one depends on the parameters of the model. For α sufficiently low, the optimum will be of type (i). As α increases, we move over cases (ii), (iii) and (iv) to (v). The properties of the CE allocation clearly show that it is possible to find allocations that have attractive properties from the perspective of equality of opportunity in the first best.
Moreover, note the qualitative similarity of activity assignment with the CE objective in theorem 1b, the Boadway et al. objective in case 2 of theorem 1a and the Non-Welfarist objective in theorem 1a. The crucial difference between these allocations in theorem 1a and the CE allocation is the determination of the consumption bundles: the Welfarist planner gives the same consumption to everyone, the Boadway et al. planner in case 2 gives lower consumption to the individuals with less deserving tastes (i.e. with a higher α), while the CE planner determines the consumption bundles such that they satisfy the ETES axiom.
(c) EE allocation
Under the EE allocation, all workers receive the same consumption bundle, irrespective of their skill level. The inactive get zero benefits. This looks harsh at first sight, but in terms of equivalent wages, the metric used by the planner in this case, these individuals are best off, and, in the present framework people are responsible for their preference. Observe that this policy satisfies EWEP.
All high-skilled pay the same tax, all low-skilled pay the same tax, and all inactive get the same zero transfer. The tax paid is not equal to minus the transfer received, however. Hence ETES is not satisfied.
The EE allocation assigns the same consumption bundle to workers as allocations FEO (i) and CE (i), but contrary to these allocations, those with high disutility of labor are not working. They are inactive, and are, actually better off (both in terms of utility and equivalent wages) than under allocations FEO (i) and CE (i).
We summarize the performance of the criteria in theorem 1a-b from the equality of opportunity principles in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: equality of opportunity axioms and social objectives in the first best.
Social Objective
Satisfies EWEP? Satisfies ETES?
Given the origin of these social orderings, it is unsurprising to see that those criteria which originate from the social choice approach to equality of opportunity perform much better than the traditional criteria. They were designed to do so. It is of course possible to search for the first best optimal allocation over the set of allocations satisfying one of the equality of opportunity principles, using the objective functions that do not satisfy the equality of opportunity principle under consideration. However, to keep the size of the paper within reasonable limits and since the second best context is more relevant, we only illustrate this procedure in the second best context 10 .
Finally, all the first best solutions listed in Theorem 1a and 1b depend on both α and w i .
Therefore, they are not implementable when the government only observes income (second best).
The next section deals with this issue.
5 Second best optima
Second best constraints and their implications
In second best, the Government needs to take into account the set of self-selection or incentive compatibility constraints (hereafter ICC) in order to prevent individuals from a given type from mimicking (i.e. taking the tax-treatment designed for) individuals of other types. We first state these IC constraints and then discuss their implications for the social objective functions.
Introducing the threshold value a * L , and dropping the superscripts U , W , B, N W , R, V , CE and EE for notational simplicity, the ICC 11 on w L -agents can be written as:
such that a low skilled with taste parameter α chooses low skilled employment instead of inactivity
Since all our objective functions are increasing in individuals' consumption, it will, just like in the first best, never be optimal that high-skilled people work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in high-skilled jobs instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more which can be used to increase everyone's consumption in a way that respects the ICC and hence increases the social objective's value.
Consequently, to induce high-skilled people to work in high-skilled jobs,
and, introducing the threshold value α * H , the ICC on agents of w H -type states
such that a high skilled agent with taste parameter α prefers high-skilled employment to inactivity if and only if α < α * H . Moreover, from (10), (11) and (12), we have that
10 We only impose one principle at a time, as imposing both principles simultaneously leads to the FEO allocation. 11 The set of IC constraints for each agent of type (w Y , α) (with Y := L, H and α ∈ R + ) can be rewritten as constraints (10)- (12). Moreover, since the labor supply decision is restricted to be binary, the (direct truthful) mechanism that implements the optimal allocations is not fully revealing. Each agent fully reveals his w Y information but not his α value; he announces only whether α is larger or lower than α * Y .
As a result of the second best constraints (10), (12) and (13), irrespective of the social objective function, activity assignment has to be of type AAR X . Moreover, because of (11), utility of w Hworkers is at least as high as of w L -workers. Hence, the utilities as a function of α, for w L -and w H -skilled agents, look as in the following Figure. 
, but the qualitative shape of the utilities as a function of α, for high-and low-skilled individuals, is always as indicated in the graph.
The second best framework has important implications for the equality of opportunity principles, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Equality of opportunity principles in the second best.
(a) A necessary and sufficient condition to fully satisfy EWEP is that α *
(b) A necessary and sufficient condition to fully satisfy ETES is that
Part (a) says that the threshold values α * L and α * H have to be the same. To accomplish this, the government has to offer the same consumption level to high and low-skilled workers. It implies that the same number of high and low-skilled individuals will work. Part (b) of the corollary follows immediately from application of the ETES axiom and has two noteworthy implications.
u and x H − w H = x u , the government cannot subsidize or tax the participation decision. Since it cannot do this at the bottom end of the skill distribution, there is neither a negative income tax nor an earned income tax credit. Second, since x L − w L = x H − w H , the government cannot redistribute between low and high-skilled workers. This is a very severe restriction, which makes the ETES axiom difficult to defend in the second best context.
As a result of the second best constraints, the second best optimal tax problem in its general form reduces to the following maximization problem.
GSBP (General Second Best Problem):
and constraints (10), (11) and (12).
The second best framework has important consequences for the specification of the social objective functions. Combining the expressions for the social objective functions (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) with expression (10), (11), (12) and (13) results in the following writing of the objective functions, as shown in Appendix B. Again, we skip the superscripts U, W , B, N W , R, V , CE and EE for notation simplicity.
(a) Utilitarian
(c) Boadway et al.
(e) Roemer and (f) Van de gaer
(g) Conditional Equality
Under asymmetric information, Roemer and Van de gaer's criterion are equal. Due to the second best constraint, utility as a function of the taste parameter of the low-skilled will never be below utility as a function of the taste parameter for the high-skilled. One implication of this is that the opportunity set for the lowly skilled is below the one for the highly skilled, hence, in the second best the mean of mins and min of means criterion will yield the same solution.
Optimal tax formula
Before we can characterize the optimal tax rates, we need to introduce more definitions. Let
, and T u = −x u , be the tax paid by the low-skilled workers, the high-skilled workers and the inactive, respectively. Define the elasticities of participation of the low-skilled with respect to x L 12 and of the high-skilled with respect to x H as
respectively. Next, observe that the average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of consumption, is given by
Let subscripts to the function S denote the partial derivative of S with respect to the argument in the subscript and note that the effect of a uniform increase in private utilities on the social objective function is given by
Finally, the average social marginal utility of consumption for workers of skill level
The following theorem states the solution for the general second best problem.
Theorem 2: Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12) and the following equations:
where ν is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint x H ≥ x L .
The λ −1 equations are similar to Diamond and Sheshinsky (1995) 's equation (6) 
H ) units of public means to finance this operation. In terms of social welfare, this is worth
. This has to be equal to the increase in the social objective function caused by the uniform increase in utilities, which is equal to D. The equation for λ −1 thus equates the inverse of the marginal cost of public funds to the ratio between the average of the inverse of the private utilities and the marginal social utility of a uniform increase in all individual utilities.
Next, we give a simple heuristic interpretation of the optimal tax formulas in the spirit of Saez (2002). Consider a small increase of the consumption x L (i.e. a small reduction of the income tax in low-skilled jobs), around the optimal tax schedule. This has a mechanical effect and a behavioral (or labor supply response) effect.
Mechanical effect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal 
in terms of government revenue, which can be written as
Behavioral effect
The change dx
and from the definition of the elasticity of participation (14)
L has a welfare effect, worth S X α * L /λ in terms of government revenue and increases gov-
Hence the total behavioral effect in terms of government revenue equals
At the optimum, the sum of the mechanical and behavioral effects has to be nil. It is easy to verify that this yields the first equation in theorem 2. The second equation can be given a similar interpretation.
Observe that the optimal tax formula in the theorem contain three elements: the deviation of the average social marginal utility of consumption for workers of a particular skill level from unity,
The last two terms have not been dealt with in the literature on optimal taxation with extensive labor supply, as they do not appear with the social objective functions U and W that have been considered so far. This is stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2: the value of S
Lemma 3: the value of the Lagrangian multiplier:
(a) ν = 0 for X = U , W , B, and N W .
(b) ν ≥ 0 for X = R, EE and CE.
Lemma 2 follows from partially differentiating the expressions for the social objective functions
These terms represent direct effects of changes in the critical values on the social objective functions and occur only in the Non-Welfarist case. Lemma 3 is slightly less straightforward. Remember that ν is equal to the sum of the welfare and budget effect of decreasing x H and, at the same time it is equal to the sum of the welfare and budget effect of increasing x L . Hence these two effects have to be equal. Moreover, if ν > 0, the sum of the welfare effects of decreasing x H and increasing x L and their government revenue effect have to be
are equal (as is the case for X = U , W , B and N W ), then the per capita budget effect of decreasing x H must be equal to the per capita budget effect of increasing In order to obtain optimal tax rates with the different social objective functions, we use the relevant properties of these social objective functions and plug them in the equations of the theorem. 
Using these expression in the equations of theorem 2, together with ν = 0 for X = U , W , B and N W results in the following corollary.
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Corollary 2. Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12) and the following equations:
Taking as a benchmark case the formula for the popular objective functions U and W , we see principles (X = R, CE or EE), it is possible that the constraint x H ≥ x L is binding and ν > 0 hence this term enters the optimal tax formula. In this case, the planner would like to decrease x L , which requires an increase in T L , such that the multiplier enters positively in the right hand side of the equation in the table for Diamond (1980) , it is well known that subsidizing the low-skilled workers more than inactive people (i.e. T L < T u ) can be optimal when the labor supply is modeled along the extensive margin. Using the definition of Saez (2002) , an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is then optimal.
On the contrary, when T L > T u a Negative Income Tax (NIT) is optimal. Alternatively, since
u , i.e. the income gain when a low-skilled agent enters the labor force (x L − x u ) is larger (lower) than the gross labor income (w L ). In other words, the labor supply of the low-skilled is distorted upwards (downwards), compared to laissez faire. 
Under the Utilitarian, the Welfarist and the Boadway et al. objectives, we retrieve the result that the average social weight of the low-skilled workers larger than one is a necessary condition for the EITC to be optimal. For the Roemer, Egalitarian Equivalent and Conditional Egalitarian objective functions, this condition has to be adjusted since the constraint that x H ≥ x L may be binding. If this constraint is binding, a NIT can be optimal even when g X L is larger than one. In that sense, these social objective functions that find their inspiration in equality of opportunity theories are more in favor of a NIT.
The necessary condition to obtain unambiguous results under the Non-Welfarist criterion is clearly more complicated: there is no simple relationship between the average social weight of the low-skilled workers being larger than one and the optimality of an EITC. The EITC (NIT) encourages (discourages) participation of the marginal worker, which results in an increased (decreased) utility of consumption equal to α N * L , which is desirable if this is larger (smaller) than α, the utility cost of work in the eyes of the Non-Welfarist planner. The extra term α
which appears at the right hand side in corollary 3 is used as a device to correct undesirable social outcomes. It corrects individual labor supply to correspond to social preferences 14 . Hence, if social preferences are characterized by α N * L > (<)α, the government encourages (discourages) participation, the right hand side of the inequality in the corollary is positive, such that the EITC (NIT) then becomes more attractive for the Non-Welfarist planner. This term is sometimes called the paternalistic or first best motive for taxation since it arises from differences between social and private preferences (Kanbur et al., 2006) . Assuming α N * L > α, when the Non-Welfarist government's views on working becomes more "Calvinistic", i.e. when α decreases, the term at the right hand side becomes larger and hence plays in favor of an EITC to promote participation of more people.
As a final point of reference, we compare our policy prescriptions with the policy prescription of the Maximin social objective function. Maximin, which is a subcase of the Welfarist criterion plays in favor of a NIT, as shown in Choné and Laroque (2005) . Under Maximin, only the least-well off receive a positive average social marginal utility of consumption. Due to the IC constraints, the least-well off are the inactive hence g W L = g W H = 0, and it can be shown that ν = 0.
15 Substituting the latter into the optimal Welfarist tax formulas of theorem 2 yields
where M has been used as superscript for Maximin. Therefore
Empirical studies suggest that participation decisions are more elastic at the bottom of the skill distribution (see the empirical evidence surveyed by Immervoll et al., 2007, and Meghir and Phillips, 2008) which motivates the following assumption: is a decreasing function and for the Roemer, EE, CE (when ξ < 1):
Our model is an extensive model of labor supply. We have that the degree to which labor supply is distorted downwards depends on the difference between taxes paid when working and taxes paid when inactive (the latter is −x u ). The larger is this difference, the more labor supply is distorted downwards; if the difference is negative, labor supply is distorted upwards. We now have the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Under assumption 1, the Utilitarian, Welfarist, and Boadway et al. criteria when W (α) is a decreasing function and the Roemer, EE and CE (when ξ < 1) criteria, the labor supply of the high-skilled is more distorted downwards than the labor supply of the low-skilled.
The statement that labor supply of the high-skilled is more downwardly distorted, also allows for the possibility that it is less upwardly distorted than the labor supply of the low-skilled. Which one of these possibilities happens, depends crucially on the amount of external resources the economy has at its disposal.
binding) all respect individual's preferences, and so they evaluate the marginal individual's disutility at α * L , such that this term drops out.
15 This follows from lemma B given in the proof of lemma 3 in the appendix, as for Maximin
For the Roemer, EE and CE criteria when ν > 0 we have η x L , α * L = η x H , α * H = η (x, α * ).
Restricted second best
Lemma 1 lists the requirement of the equality of opportunity principles in the second best. In this section, we search for the optimal policies when these policies are restricted such that they satisfy at least one of the principles fully. Appendix D gives all proofs of this section.
In the discussion following lemma 1, we already noted the restrictive nature of ETES. The severity of the ETES axiom in the context of our model also appears clearly in the following theorem, which shows that, in the second best, there is only one possible allocation that satisfies ETES.
Theorem 3. Second best optima satisfying ETES.
There exists only one second best allocation satisfying ETES. The corresponding values for
Due to the severe implications of the ETES axiom in our model, we think that, in the second best model, priority should be given to the EWEP principle. We now show which allocations are second best optimal under the different criteria, when the optimum is sought under the allocations satisfying EWEP. Of course, when the optimal policies under the equality of opportunity inspired social objective functions automatically satisfy EWEP (i.e. when ν > 0), the optima derived in this section for X = R, EE and CE will be identical to the optima in the previous subsection.
From lemma 1, (a) we know that the critical values and the consumption levels for both types of workers have to be the same. We denote this critical value by α * and the workers' consumption by x w :
The only policy instruments of the planner are now x w and x u which prevents any redistribution between w L and w H -workers. Hence, the following programming problem describes the EWEPrestricted general second best problem:
subject to the government budget constraint,
and constraint (18).
We define the following elasticity of participation (which is any of the previous elasticities where
The average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of consumption is now given by
the effect of a uniform increase in private utilities on the social objective function equals
and the average social marginal utility of workers' consumption is
The following theorem states the solution for the EWEP restricted General Second Best Problem.
Theorem 4: Under asymmetric Information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraint (18), and the following equations:
The interpretation of the equation for λ −1 is similar to the interpretation in the previous section.
To obtain more specific expressions for the different social objective functions, observe that S X α * = 0 for all objective functions, except for the Non-Welfarist, for which S X α * = (α * − α) f (α * ). The average social marginal utility of consumption g X under objective function X (= U, W , B, N , R, CE or EE) is given in the following table:
All these ingredients are used in the expressions in theorem 4 to obtain the following corollary which gives the optimal consumption levels in the restricted second best.
Corollary 6: Under asymmetric information, the second best optimal consumption levels satisfying EWEP have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraint (18) and the following equations:
Unsurprisingly, the optimal tax formulas have the same shape as in the previous subsection, but now the constraint x H = x L is imposed. The major difference is due to the fact that EWEP impedes the government to distinguish between low and high-skilled workers, such that the formula now have to hold for an imaginary worker who has average productivity and thus average wage
Priority principles
The social choice literature to equality of opportunity argues that, since compensation and responsibility cannot be fully satisfied in general, only a maximin variant makes sense (Fleurbaey, 2008) .
Therefore, rather than strictly imposing one of the equality of opportunity principles and searching for the optimal allocation satisfying it, this section examines the optimal tax policies when priority to the worst off is given. The strict equality demanded by each of the principles is weakened and replaced with maximin and we search for social orderings that embody this weak version of the principle.
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EWEP requires that for each value of α, welfares are equalized. Rather than insisting on full equality, the priority principle requires that social states are judged, for each α, by the welfare level obtained by the skill level L or H, that has the lowest welfare. It expresses the idea that the allocation of consumption levels and jobs between two individuals with identical tastes should be such it is impossible to redistribute among them and increase the level of well-being of the least well off.
The question then becomes how to measure individuals' welfare. A first possibility is to measure welfare by individual utilities. Roemer's criterion applies a Utilitarian aggregation to these minimal levels of welfare, but other aggregation procedures are possible, such as a Welfaristic and a Boadway 17 For an interesting alternative, social choice approach, starting from such priority principles see Maniquet (2005 and 2007) .
et al. variant, leading to the Priority Welfare weighted Utility ordering
where Ω R (·) is a welfare function with Ω R′ (·) > 0 and the Priority Taste weighted Utility ordering
where Φ R (α) > 0 weights different tastes. These two objective functions are clearly distinct: S P T U allows the planner to express inequality aversion (preference) with respect to utility differences that arise due to differences in tastes if Ω R′′ (·) < (>) 0, while in S P W U the planner gives different weights to different tastes as such, irrespective of their welfare levels. Both are generalizations of Roemer's criterion but they do not respect the utilitarian reward principle (see Fleurbaey (2008) ), which requires zero aversion to inequalities due to different preferences. However, if the planner wants to express an opinion about welfare inequality that arizes due to differences in tastes, these specifications allow the planner to do so.
A second approach consists in taking an ordinal measure of welfare. We can find here inspiration with the reasoning that leads to the Egalitarian Equivalent ordering, and take that consumption level a person requires when he works that makes him indifferent to his actual consumption bundle.
The aggregation of these welfare levels can occur again in a Welfarist or a Boadway et al. way, leading to the Priority Welfare weighted Equivalent ordering
where Ω O (·) is a welfare function with Ω O′ (·) > 0 and the Priority Taste weighted Equivalent ordering
where Φ O (α) > 0 weights different tastes. If the welfare function Ω O (·) becomes infinitely inequality averse, the social welfare function (24) reduces to the egalitarian equivalent ordering (9).
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ETES requires that transfers are the same for all those that have equal skills. To apply the priority principle here, for each level of skill we have to consider the lowest transfer received by an individual with that skill level. Since we have only two levels of skill, a social ordering embodying the priority principle would be the following Priority Transfer ordering
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] gives the relative importance attached to the low-skilled agents.
The following lemma gives expressions for these new objective functions in the second best framework.
Lemma 4: priority social objective functions in the second best.
The problem of finding the optimal tax rates with these objective functions has exactly the same structure as the General Second Best Problem formulated in section 5.1, and whose solution is given by theorem 2.
Lemma 5: the value of S
= 0 for X = P W U , P T U , P W E, P T E and P T .
Lemma 6: the value of the Lagrangian multiplier:
ν ≥ 0 for X = P W U , P T U , P W E, P T E and P T .
Combining lemma 6 with lemma 1 (a) we see how the different criteria perform from the EWEPperspective: for P W U , P T U , P W E, P T E and P T the constraint x H ≥ x L can be binding, in
L and their solution satisfies EWEP. The average social marginal utility of consumption g X Y under objective function X (= P W U, P T U , P W E, P T E or P T ) for agents of skill level Y (= L or H) are given in the following table.
Using these expressions in theorem 2 results in the following corollary.
Corollary 7. Under asymmetric information, the optimal consumption levels have to satisfy the budget constraint, constraints (10), (11) and (12) and the following equations:
H ) The optimal tax rates have the same structure under the P W U , P T U , P W E, P T E and P T social objective functions in the sense that the multiplier ν pushes the tax system away from the EITC. This is shown in the next lemma.
Corollary 8. Optimality of EITC or NIT in second best with a priority requirement.
Social Objective
ETES/ NIT/ EITC?
Under assumption 1, we can derive the following counterparts to corollaries 4 and 5.
Moreover, the proof of the corollaries is similar to the proofs of corollaries 4 and 5 for the Roemer, EE and CE social objective functions, and is suppressed.
Corollary 9. Under assumption 1, for the P W U , P T U , P W E, P T E and P T social objective functions:
Corollary 10. Under assumption 1, for the P W U , P T U , P W E, P T E and P T social objective functions , the labor supply of the high-skilled is more distorted downwards than the labor supply of the low-skilled.
Conclusion
This paper has studied optimal tax policies when agents differ in terms of skills and tastes for labor.
We assumed quasilinear utility and that labor supply decision is at the extensive margin. The optimal tax policies under distinct objective functions have been derived, in full and asymmetric information.
The determination of appealing social criteria is important if one looks for social preferences applicable in public economics, in particular when dealing with redistribution. When agents differ in terms of skills and tastes for labor, the equality of opportunity approach is inspiring (Fleurbaey, 1995a ) and broadly accepted (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) . This paper has shown that many criteria in the optimal tax literature (Utilitarianism, Welfarism, Boadway et al., Van de gaer and Non-Welfarist criteria) fail the requirements of equality of opportunity, i.e. the compensation (EWEP) and responsibility (ETES) principles. It has been shown that, in the first best, criteria respecting one of these principles are Roemer's, the Conditional Equality and the Egalitarian Equivalent criterion, the latter two advocated by Fleurbaey (1995b) . Given that these criteria were designed so as to meet one of the principles in the first best, this should not come as a surprise. We also showed that in the second best, these criteria might satisfy EWEP, while the standard criteria from the optimal tax literature never satisfy it.
The difference between the standard approaches and the equality of opportunity approach is not just a difference between the way social marginal utilities of incomes of individuals are aggregated, but goes much deeper.
In this paper, we explore two ways to deal with the equality of opportunity principles in the second best model. One is to search for optimal policies over the allocations that satisfy one of the principles. The other is to weaken the full equality demanded in the equality of opportunity principles, and replace them by priority principles, as advocated in social choice (Fleurbaey, 2008) .
We therefore build up new criteria; one satisfying an ETES-priority principle and several others satisfying EWEP-priority principles leading to generalizations of Roemer's criterion and the egalitarian equivalent allocation. They have similar properties to the other equality of opportunity principles, but allow the researcher to express different kinds and extents of inequality aversion.
Throughout we find that the equality of opportunity approach tends to work against an Earned Income Tax Credit and in favor of a Negative Income Tax.
Appendix A: Proofs of Section 4.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1a.
The Lagrangian functions for each of the social objective functions are formed by combining the expressions for the social objective functions given in Section 3.2, the government budget constraint
(1) and its associated Lagrangian multiplier λ.
(a) Welfarist and (b) Utilitarian planners
We discuss the Welfarist case first, and show how the properties of the Utilitarian case follow. The first-order conditions of the constrained optimization problem with respect to the four consumption functions are:
Since δ L (α) and δ H (α) are equal to 1 or 0, for each value of α, only two of these first-order conditions matter; for those that matter the corresponding social marginal utilities of consumption have to be equal, for the other two the consumption function does not matter (as nobody with this value for α is receiving it). So we get for all those that do not work:
Due to the strict concavity of Ψ ′ (·) and v ′ (·), this can only hold true if
For those that work, we get
For a given value for α, the requirement is exactly the same for w L -and w H -workers. Hence, for a given value of α, both get the same consumption bundle and so, for all α :
Hence worker's consumption bundles depend on α. Moreover, from the implicit function theorem:
Therefore, for α 1 < α 2 , due to the concavity of v (.) we have:
Combining the last inequality with (28) requires that
and so low-skilled workers with a higher disutility of labor are not fully compensated for this higher disutility. Due to (29), the same holds for high-skilled workers. Note that from (28) with α = 0 and (27) we get that
The government budget constraint only depends on the number of high and low-skilled that work, not on which high and low-skilled. From (30) workers' consumption is increasing in their disutility of work, and so it is cheapest and hence optimal for the government to make those work with the lowest α. In view of (29), putting high-skilled and low-skilled at work is equally expensive for the government, but since high-skilled contribute more to the budget than low-skilled, more high-skilled than low-skilled will have to work. Hence, there exist critical values for α * L and α * H such that
The Welfarist criterion reduces to the Utilitarian one when Ψ(.)
Therefore, under the Utilitarian criterion, (27)- (28) yield that the first-order conditions with respect to consumption reduce to (∀α) (since λ is a constant):
Since all individuals get the same consumption bundle, it follows from the reasoning leading to
The first-order conditions with respect to consumption functions (assuming an interior solution)
are:
Consequently, we get
Given α, it is equally costly to have high and low-skilled at work, but since high skilled workers contribute more to the government budget, the government always prefers to have more high than low-skilled at work. From (33), consumption depends on taste for leisure. Application of the implicit function theorem to the equation
Using (33) in the government budget constraint (1) yields that the function x (α) must be such
For the government budget constraint it only matters how many high and low-skilled people work, it does not matter which high and low-skilled people work. Hence, differential treatment in job assignment between equally skilled people must be based on the objective function. Using (4), the value of the objective function is given by:
Whether people with high or low disutility of effort should be working depends on the last two terms of this expression. If W (α) a is increasing, having people with a high disutility working is not a good idea. From this it follows that, if the elasticity of the weight function (
) is larger than −1, then it is optimal for the government not to employ people that have a high disutility of work. If this elasticity is smaller than −1, it will be optimal to employ people with a high disutility of work. Consequently, the functions δ L (α) and δ H (α) can have different shapes:
α is a constant): see discussion below, Case 3:
H . Analyzing case 2 in more detail, the problem facing the planner with W (α) α constant has the following Lagrangian:
which leads to the following:
Note that the second and third condition cannot hold simultaneously with equality:
Hence, since w H > w L , we always have that
We then get the possibilities listed in case 2 of the theorem.
(d) Non-Welfarist social planner
It is easy to see that we obtain the same first-order conditions as with the Utilitarian objective, and so the consumption functions are similar to (32): everybody receives the same level of consumption x, which, because of the government budget constraint equals γw L n L +(1 − γ) w H n H −R.
Consequently, using (5), the value of our Non-Welfaristic objective function becomes
This expression only depends on the number of low and high-skilled that are employed; the planner determines n L and n H so as to maximize this expression. The derivatives of this expression with respect to n H and n L are, respectively
Since w H > w L , we can distinguish the cases listed in the theorem.
(e) Roemer planner
There is no point in allowing the two elements in the min operator of Roemer's objective function to be different in the first best. Hence there are in principle four possibilities:
There is equivalence between the maximin approach and the revenue-maximizing approach.
Maximizing tax revenue subject to a minimal utility level is equivalent to maximizing the minimum of utility subject to the revenue constraint. Here, the objective function maximizes the sum of the minimal utility levels but the logic is similar. The government maximizes the tax revenue subject to minimal utility levels. The tax revenue will be maximized the more people are working, in particular productive people. The minimal utility levels avoid that people with large α work.
Therefore, if anyone, we would like the ones with low values for α to work, and since highly skilled have a higher productivity, we want more highly skilled to work (α * H ≥ α * L ); for α increasing, we move from (i) over (ii) to (iii). If we plug this in, we get the following objective function:
Maximizing this objective function implies
Therefore, the objective function can be rewritten as
The government budget constraint (1) can be formulated as follows:
Forming the Lagrangian with objective function (37), the previous government budget constraint and the Lagrangian multiplier λ, the first-order conditions with respect to x w L (α) and x u L (α) are:
.
From the first and second first-order conditions, we have (since λ is constant):
(f ) Van de gaer planner:
In the first best, there is no reason for having different values for opportunity sets of different skill-types. For the same reasons as usual, if anybody works, it will be those with a low disutility of work. Hence the objective function reduces to:
This objective function must be maximized subject to two constraints. The first is that both opportunity sets must have the same value:
The second is the budget constraint:
Forming the Lagrangian with objective function (38), the equality of opportunity set constraint (39) with the associated Lagrangian multiplier µ and the government budget constraint (40) with its Lagrangian multiplier λ, the first-order conditions with respect to
From (41)- (42) and (43)- (44) respectively, we have:
Substituting these two equations into the equality of opportunity sets constraint (39) gives:
If α * L = α * H , then x = x. However, such a situation cannot be optimal, as high-skilled workers contribute more to the government budget than low-skilled workers. Therefore, α * L < α * H hence x < x. LEMMA A.
Lemma A: for an allocation that satisfies EWEP and ETES, there cannot exist an α ∈ R + :
Proof. If such an α existed, we would have by EWEP that for this value either v (x
, both of which are impossible since by ETES the consumption bundles cannot depend on α.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1b. It is easy to verify that the allocations (i) and (ii) satisfy both axioms. Their consumption bundles follow from the government budget constraint (1).
(b) CE allocation: a first thing to note is that for the allocation to equalize u (x Y (α) , δ Y (α) , α)
for all α and Y = L, H requires that utility is independent of w Y . This has the following implica-
In addition, all those assigned in a job have to get the same level of utility, which implies that their consumption bundle cannot depend on α, and thus
In addition, all those that are inactive have to get the same level of utility, implying that their consumption bundle cannot
, which combined with case (i) and (ii) gives
, which combined with case 1 and 2 gives x
Combining these results, we get
Everybody gets the same level of utility v (x u ) in the optimum, and so the problem of the first best allocation then amounts to maximize the equal utility level v (x u ) with respect to x u , n L and n H subject to the budget constraint
The Lagrangian for this problem is
Taking derivatives, we get :
The two last first-order derivatives cannot possibly both be equal to zero at the same time:
Hence we either have that
and ∂L ∂nH > 0, implying n H = 1 and n L follows from the budget constraint,
∂L ∂nL < 0, implying n L = 0 and n H follows from the budget constraint or
Which of these allocations yields the highest value for v (x u ) depends on the parameters of the model. If α is sufficiently low, the optimum will be case (i), as α rises, we move from (i) to (ii),
as it increases further we move to (iii) and (iv) and for values of α sufficiently high, the optimum will be case (v). To get an equivalent wage of exactly x, a person with taste parameter α needs an inactivity
, which is independent of his skill level. Since we maximin the equivalent wages, the transfer for the inactive is However, working people produce w L or w H , while inactive people produce nothing. As a consequence, it can never be optimal to have people inactive for which α ≤ α: they cost v −1 (v ( x) − α) ≥ 0, but produce nothing. The best policy that maximizes S EE under budget constraint is therefore
Appendix B: Proofs of section 5.1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.
(a) Suppose the proposition does not hold true. By (13), we then have that α * H > α * L . In that case, there exist α, α * L < α < α * H for which highly skilled workers get utility v (x H ) − α and lowly skilled workers get v (x u ). Since the former depends on α, but the latter doesn't these two can never be equal for all α, α * L < α < α * H , and so EWEP must be violated. To see part (e), observe that (11) (due to incentive constraints) implies that for all α, v(
To see part (f), note that, in second best, Van de gaer's objective function is
Due to the incentive constraints, this reduces to (45).
To see part (g), observe that, since the policy can no longer depend on α, (8) reduces to
where, for Y = L or H, δ Y = 1 or 0 and
However, since (11) holds true, the first element in the set behind the min sign is always the smallest; the low skilled will always be the worst off and
and so objective function (46) was not maximized. To prevent this from occurring, we maximize v (x L ) − α subject to the constraint that α ≥ α * L . The multiplier associated to this constraint is denoted by ξ.
To see part (h), note that the equivalent wages for the employed are equal to x Y (Y = H or L) and for the inactive v −1 (v (x u ) + α). The objective is to maximize the lowest equivalent wage.
Consider the inactive. Since v −1 (.) is an increasing function, the equivalent wage is lowest for those inactive having the lowest value for α; which are those with α = α * L . Hence the lowest value for the equivalent wage is
Appendix C: Proofs of Section 5.2.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.
The Lagrangian function for the general second best problem is
which has to be maximized with respect to x L , x H , x u , α * L , α * H and c, taking into account that c ≥ 0. This leads to the following first-order conditions:
−ν ≤ 0 and νc = 0.
Solving (47) for µ L and equating the resulting expression to the LHS of (50), we obtain
, from which
Using the definition (14), we get
Similarly, solving (49) for µ H , equating the resulting expression to the LHS of (51) and using definition (15), we get
Divide the equations (47)- (49) by the marginal utility on their RHS, adding the resulting equation for (47) and (49) and equating the result to (49) yields
Collecting the terms in λ gives
. Now, note that from (52), if ν > 0, then c = 0, such that x H = x L and the last term in the above equation always drops out. Using definitions (16) and (17) gives λg X P = D X , and thus
Follows immediately from partially differentiating the expressions for S X with respect to α * L and α * H .
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.
Step 1: we proof the following lemma:
Proof:
Using (51) in (49) and solving for ν, we obtain
Hence, ν > 0 (such that x H = x L = x and α * H = α * L = α * ) if and only if
Similarly, using (47) in (50) and solving for ν,
we find that ν > 0 if and only if
If the antecedent of lemma B holds true, the right hand sides of (53) and (54) are equal, such that ν > 0 requires
but this can only hold true if w H < w L , which goes against the model's assumptions.
Step 2: we compute the expressions that occur in lemma B. They are given in the following table.
20 Under the assumption that the constraint α ≥ α * is not binding.
Clearly, for X = U, W, B and N W , by lemma B, ν = 0.
PROOF OF FOOTNOTE 13.
Step 1: we proof the following Lemma: (47) and (50) gives:
Combining equations (49) and (51) we can write:
/ (1 − γ) for X = U, W, B and N W from the previous table, the two previous equations yield λf(α * )(w L − x + x u ) = λf(α * ) (w H − x + x u ) but this can only hold true if w H = w L , which leads to a contradiction. We can conclude that
From lemma C, (10) and (12) we have α * H > α * L under the U, W, B and N W criteria.
Step 2: in second best, α * H , α * L < ∞. Proof. As ∀α : f(α) > 0, all low-ability (high-ability) people work means α * L → ∞ (α * H → ∞) at the optimum. Since consumption levels are finite, from (10) and (resp. (12)), α * L and α * H cannot tend to ∞.
Step 3 
Going back to the table in this appendix, it is clear that for all the criteria the right hand side is negative, such that α * L = 0 can only be optimal if w L < 0, which, however, was excluded by assumption.
Step 4: to complete the proof, note that we have shown that, for the U , W , B, and NW criterion, ν = 0, such that x H > x L (using lemma C) and thus α * H > α * L . For X = R, EE and CE, we have shown that ν ≥ 0, such that α * H ≥ α * L .
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.
The proof is obvious from the table in corollary 2.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4. Welfarist optimum.
Combined with η (x L , α * L ) ≥ η (x H , α * H ), it follows from the expressions in theorem 2, that (T L − T u ) /x L < (T H − T u ) /x H .
Boadway et al. optimum.
Note that
, which holds as ≥ automatically if W (α) is a decreasing function, and as ≤ if W (α) is an increasing function.
Therefore, assume that W (α) is a decreasing function hence g
, and the assumption that η (x L , α * L ) ≥ η (x H , α * H ), it follows from the expressions in theorem 2, that (
Roemer, EE and CE (when ξ < 1).
There are two cases to consider: By definition,
. Therefore under assumption 1, from corollary 4, we have that for the planners considered in the corollary,
Appendix D: Proofs of Section 5.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.
From the government budget constraint, we have that
Substituting the ETES constraints w L − x L = −x u and w H − x H = −x u and rearranging gives the first expression in the lemma. The second and third expression follow from (10) and (12), the definitions of the critical values a * L and α * H .
21 Note that using x L = x H and α * L = α * H into (14)- (15) 
from which, using definitions (20) and (21), we get λg X = D X , and so λ −1 = g X /D X .
Appendix E: Proofs of Section 5.4
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.
(a) Proof for S P W U , S P T U , S P W E and S P T U .
Observe that in the second best, for α < α * Substituting these properties into S P W U and S P T U yields S P W U and S P T U , respectively.
Substituting these properties into S P W E and S P T E leads to S P W E and S P T E . In the procedure,
(b) Proof for S P T .
Since consumption levels do not depend on α in the second best, S P T reduces to
Hence, with the ETES priority principle, the Lagrangian is
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
(i) Suppose x L − w L ≥ x u . The first-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to x L then
, from which µ L > 0. However, the first-order condition with respect to α * L gives µ L = λγf (α * L ) (w L − x L + x u ) ≤ 0 under the assumption made. Hence we obtain a contradiction, such that we know that x L − w L < x u .
(ii) Suppose x H − w H ≥ x u . Then we get −T H ≥ x u ; the high-skilled workers receive a larger subsidy than the inactive people which cannot not be optimal. Consequently, x H − w H < x u .
As a result of (i) and (ii), the ETES priority principle reduces to ρ (x L − w L )+(1 − ρ) (x H − w H ).
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.
That for all objective functions S = 0 for X = P T U , P W E and P T E.
PROOF OF LEMMA 6.
The proof follows the reasoning for lemma 3 (using lemma 5) so is skipped here.
